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Introduction
Since 2011, there has been a rapid development in freight transport rail links between China and Europe, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East. On the initiative of the Deutsche Bahn, the China-Europe commercial link 
has developed rapidly: offers of service between the town of origin of a convoy 
and that of its destination (origin-destination couples) have multiplied, and 
the number of trains has also risen sharply. Admittedly, the rail industry’s share 
of the trans-Asian freight market remains low. In 2017, it represented around 
2% of exports from China to Europe. Although marginal, however, the market 
share of rail freight has risen from almost zero to 2% in the space of five 
years (Wanderpepen 2017). Beijing hopes to increase this to between 5 and 
7% in 2020, and to 25% of exports from the west and centre of China.1
An analysis of this expansion in rail traffic is relevant from several points 
of view. Firstly, it is a market, admittedly modest, that is developing very fast. 
Moreover, the rail infrastructure is to be found in the six corridors officially 
defined in 2015 by the National Development and Reform Commission 
(NDRC), the governmental body in charge of supervising the Silk Road 
project, and which constitute the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative 
(BRI), although the BRI project is not limited to rail. The importance of rail 
transport is understandable from a strictly economic point of view: since the 
aim is to promote trade and facilitate the reorganisation of the distribution 
of manufacturers in China and Asia, the railways are a more effective and 
economical tool, especially in relation to road transport because of the large 
volume of goods they are able to carry over long distances (OCDE 2011; 
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Rodrigue 2020). Simeon Djankov, former Bulgarian minister of finance and 
a World Bank executive, summarised it thus: “Rail is the most important 
element in the new Silk Road” (Gramer 2017).
Since 2013, numerous publications have tackled the BRI project. Although 
many authors emphasise that this project involves the construction of a 
vast infrastructure linking China to the rest of the world (Lincot 2015; Thorez 
2016), for which rail projects represent a major part of the investment (Pepe 
2016; Jakobowski 2018), many of these publications concentrate on the 
international relations aspect, approaching the question from the point of 
view of the power bestowed upon China (Jin and Lin 2015), whilst largely 
leaving aside practical questions such as transport services, the construction 
of infrastructure, and the development of the corridors. China’s aim is to 
strengthen trade links and improve its connectivity with its markets (Rolland 
2015; Vicenty 2017) whilst at the same time selling Chinese know-how. 
The success of the development of these corridors should allow Beijing to 
confirm its new status as a regional and world power (Fasslabend 2015; 
Rolland 2015; Astarita and Damiani 2016).
This rapid development of commercial rail traffic, which few specialists had 
anticipated, reflects the conjunction of several commercial and political factors. 
Does this allow us to state that Eurasian trade will see a not insignificant 
proportion of its goods transiting by rail? Over and above the economic 
aspect, is China’s activism in the railway sector an expression of political will? 
1. “China-Europe Rail Freight continues to soar,” Rail Journal, 18 April 2017, www.railjournal.com/index.
php/freight/china-europe-rail-freight-continues-to-soar.html (accessed on 7 September 2019).
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Our methodological approach fits into the theoretical framework of geo-
economics, which can be defined as the analysis of the territorial deployment 
of the economic – notably commercial – strategies determined by a state 
and other players within the context of policies aimed at promoting its 
national economy. These strategies include support for certain sectors and 
help for national companies in mastering key technologies that will enable 
them to conquer segments of the world market in a strategic product, since 
achieving this objective confers on the holder – state or “national” company 
– an element of power and international influence (Lorot 2009; Lasserre et al. 
2016). Therefore, since geo-economics examines the relationships between 
power and territory, the construction of trans-state and trans-border rail 
megastructures such as those of the BRI provides an excellent illustration of 
an issue falling within the scope of a geo-economic analysis. 
The quantitative data were collected from Chinese government 
departments and from the official literature, professional sources, and 
international consignors. Many government reports, statements by railway 
companies, and analyses by international bodies – either financial such as 
the OECD or technical such as the UIC – were also used in this research.
This article will first analyse the boom in trans-Asian rail traffic and 
infrastructure projects. It will be observed that these projects are not 
all recent nor did they all originate in China, but that China has brought 
together and taken over projects that in some cases already existed. Issues of 
economic policy and the commercial strengths and weaknesses of these rail 
projects will then be discussed.
Chinese railway activism 
Rail services for the transportation of goods between China and Europe 
have expanded rapidly and are beginning to develop between China and 
the Middle East. In 2013, 80 trains ran between China and Europe, rising to 
815 in 2015, 1,752 in 2016, 3,673 in 2017, and 6,363 in 2018.2 The volume 
of traffic between China and Europe rose from 114,000 tonnes in 2013 to 
511,000 tonnes in 2016,3 whilst the volume of containerised rail freight has 
also expanded significantly (Table 1).
The UIC has estimated the potential for growth at 15% per annum 
reaching 636,000 EVP in 2027, that is, 21 trains a day (Berger 2017). 
Kazakhstan Railways takes an optimistic view and expects 2 million 
containers by 2020.4 The development of these trade links is not limited to 
trade between Western Europe and China: links have also been established 
with Russia and Iran, and China also hopes to develop rail services to 
Southeast Asia. Although projects for the construction of new rail tracks 
exist, China-Europe services rely mainly on the existing network. 
These links therefore use existing networks, some of which are relatively 
well-established, such as the Trans-Siberian (1916), the Trans-Manchurian 
(1903), and the Trans-Mongolian (1961) for the northern route. The central 
route passes along the Lanzhou-Urumqi line, completed in 1962 and 
extended from Urumqi to Alashankou in 1990 by a single line, to connect, 
at the time, to the USSR in Druzhba/Dosty (1990). The current service 
continues through Kazakhstan on the ex-Soviet network via Astana. China 
intends to complete and modernise this often inadequate network to enable 
it to cope with the considerable increase in traffic. Besides the possibility 
of doubling the single-line sections and completing the electrification of 
the networks, several projects have recently been successfully completed 
or begun (Map). In the west, for example, several recent developments 
have emerged to complete the connections: the high-speed (HS) rail link 
(50 km/h in commercial speed) Lanzhou-Urumqi (1,776 km), completed in 
2013 and which frees the traditional route from passengers, and the Jinghe-
Yining-Khorgos line (286 km), finished in December 2009.5 In December 2011, 
a rail track between Khorgos and Zhetigen, near Almaty, was completed in 
Kazakhstan,6 connecting it to the Kazakh network. China is counting on the 
development of the Khorgos multimodal station to increase its capacity in 
the direction of Europe, Central Asia, and the Middle East. A Kashgar-Osh rail 
link via the Torugart Pass is planned, where it will continue on to Tashkent 
and the Central Asia network.7 In June 2016, the Pap-Angren line was 
opened, linking the Ferghana Valley network to the Uzbek network, doubling 
the track running through Tadjikistan via Khujand.8 Lastly, the Kunming-Dali 
railway track was completed in 1998, and work on its extension to Ruili, on 
the Myanmar border, began in 2011.9 
2. “China-Europe Rail Freight Transport Market 2019-2024,” Mordor Intelligence, 2019, www.
mordorintelligence.com/industry-reports/china-europe-rail-freight-transport-market (accessed on 
26 April 2019). 
3. “New rail routes between China and Europe will change trade patterns,” The Economist, 16 
September 2017, https://www.economist.com/news/business/21728981-new-silk-railroad-will-
challenge-airlines-and-shipping-firms-new-rail-routes-between-china (accessed on 8 February 2018).
4. “Tenfold growth in 5 years: Everybody focused on this market,” Rail Turkey, 31 October 2017, 
https://railturkey.org/2017/10/31/tenfold-growth-in-5-years-everybody-focused-on-this-market/ 
(accessed on 15 January 2018).
5. Government of the People’s Republic of China,“新疆首條電氣化鐵路-精伊霍鐵路18日正式
通車運營” (Xinjiang shou tiao dianqihua tielu – Jing-Yi-Huo tielu 18 ri zhengshi tongche yunying, 
The first electrified railway from Jinghe-Yining-Khorgos to Xinjiang was officially opened to traffic 
on 18 December), 18 December 2009, www.gov.cn/jrzg/2009-12/19/content_1491194.htm 
Traffic via the network of Russian, Kazakh, and Belorussian operators. In TEU (Twenty-foot Equivalent Units).
Sources: “New Silk Road in 2019: More trains, less empties and lots of politics,” RailFreight.com, 30 December 2019, https://www.railfreight.com/specials/2019/12/30/new-silk-road-in-2019-a-wrap/ (accessed 
on 16 March 2020); “Faster speed and lower costs – the China-Europe freight success story,” The LoadStar, 19 March 2019, https://theloadstar.com/faster-speed-and-lower-costs-the-china-europe-rail-freight-
success-story/ (accessed on 26 April 2019); “Eurasian rail traffic in 2018: Heading to a million TEUs,” RailFreight, 24 December 2018, www.railfreight.com/specials/2018/12/24/eurasian-rail-traffic-in-2018-
heading-to-a-million-teus/ (accessed on 3 January 2019); Greg Knowler, “Central Asia containerized rail freight rocketing,” JOC.com, 6 February 2018, www.joc.com/rail-intermodal/central-asia-rail-freight-
surges-2017_20180206.html (accessed on 15 February 2018); “Tenfold growth in 5 years: everybody focused on this market,” Rail Turkey, 31 October 2017, https://railturkey.org/2017/10/31/tenfold-growth-in-
5-years-everybody-focused-on-this-market/ (accessed on 15 January 2018); Berger (2017).
Table 1. Volume of containerised rail freight between Asia and Europe
    2011   2012   2013   2014   2015   2016   2017   2018   2019
 China-Europe 1,100 3,500 5,600 21,000 47,400 104,500 175,000 370,000 393,000 (est.)
 Asia-Europe    25,000 65,000      145,794 277,000  
(accessed on 22 September 2017).
6. “Zhetygen-Korgas Railroad to start operating on December 9,” TengriNews, 5 December 2011, 
https://in.tengrinews.kz/industry_infrastructure/Zhetygen-Korgas-railroad-to-start-operating-on-
December-9-5981/ (accessed on 22 September 2017). 
7. “Railway: Kyrgyzstan and the southern corridor of Eurasia,” Times of Central Asia, 4 October 2016, 
https://www.timesca.com/index.php/news/26-opinion-head/17183-railway-kyrgyzstan-and-the-
southern-corridor-of-eurasia-part-3 (accessed on 2 February 2018). 
8. “Uzbekistan’s new railway to isolation,” Radio Free Europe, 25 February 2016, www.rferl.org/
a/qishloq-ovozi-uzbekistan-tajikistan-railway-angren-pap/27574309.html (accessed on 15 
February 2018).
9. “大瑞鐵路保瑞段奠基” (Darui tielu baorui duan dianji, Inauguration of the railway line from 
Dali to Ruili), Xinhua, 31 May 2011, http://news.163.com/11/0531/08/75CDDAJS00014AED.
html (accessed 16 March 2020).
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10. “China to Design New Russian High-Speed Railway,” The Wall Street Journal, 19 June 2015, https://
www.wsj.com/articles/china-to-design-new-russian-high-speed-railway-1434729400 (accessed on 
8 October 2017); “Russia & China to invest $15bn in high-speed rail link from Moscow to Kazan,” 
Russia Today, 1 September 2015, https://www.rt.com/business/314003-russia-china-railways-
putin/ (accessed on 8 October 2017); “Will the Moscow-Kazan High Speed Train Route Connect 
Through To Beijing?”, Russia Briefing, 6 March 2017, https://www.russia-briefing.com/news/will-
moscow-kazan-high-speed-train-route-connect-beijing.html/ (accessed on 8 October 2017). 
11. “Russia and Kazakhstan agreed on route of Eurasia railway corridor,” EurAsia News, 17 November 
2017, https://eadaily.com/in/news/2017/11/17/russia-and-kazakhstan-agreed-on-route-of-
eurasia-railway-corridor (accessed on 23 May 2018). 
12. “Russian Officials Voice Concerns about Chinese-Funded Rail Line,” The Epoch Times, 1 January 
2019, www.theepochtimes.com/russian-officials-voice-concerns-about-chinese-funded-
rail_2753913.html (accessed on 25 April 2019); “Putin Approves $16bn High-Speed Railway Mega 
Project,” Russia Business Today, 16 April 2019, https://russiabusinesstoday.com/infrastructure/putin-
approves-16bn-high-speed-railway-mega-project/ (accessed on 16 March 2020). 
13. “Moscow-Kazan high speed rail construction to be launched in 2018,” Railway Pro, 17 August 2017, 
www.railwaypro.com/wp/moscow-kazan-high-speed-rail-construction-launched-2018/ (accessed 
on 8 October 2017). 
14. “Russia Green-lights First Section of Moscow-Kazan High-speed Railway,” Russia Business Today, 
21 January 2015, https://russiabusinesstoday.com/economy/russia-green-lights-first-section-of-
moscow-kazan-high-speed-railway/ (accessed on 25 April 2019). 
15. “High-speed rail project finally gets on track,” China Daily, 22 December 2017, www.chinadaily.
com.cn/a/201712/22/WS5a3c4675a31008cf16da2bdc.html (accessed on 16 May 2018). 
16. “Bangkok set to be China’s rail hub,” Bangkok Post, 28 December 2015, https://www.bangkokpost.com/
news/general/808364/bangkok-set-to-be-hub-of-pan-asia-rail-routes (accessed on 19 May 2018). 
17. “Construction of Thai-Chinese high-speed rail to start fully next year,” Xinhua, 3 June 2018, www.
xinhuanet.com/english/2018-06/03/c_137226904.htm (accessed on 25 April 2019). 
Lastly, projects have been developed for the construction of new 
infrastructure (Map). High speed lines are rarely designed for transporting a 
mixture of passengers and heavy freight, but instead free ordinary tracks from 
passenger traffic and therefore give greater flexibility to freight convoys. The 
Moscow-Kazan high-speed line project with the participation of China, but with 
a Russian gauge (1.52 m), was agreed and signed in 2015 as part of the major 
Moscow-Beijing high-speed project put forward in 2014.10 It was suggested that 
a mixture of passenger and freight use this high-speed line,11 provided the 
final financial package was approved.12 Work was to have begun in 2018,13 
but at the beginning of 2019, this did not seem to have been the case.14
The construction of a high-speed line towards Southeast Asia is planned, 
and work on the Kunming-Vientiane (Laos) track began in December 2016. 
A metric track was initially planned, in conformity with the gauge prevalent 
in Southeast Asia, but the line under construction will have standard gauge 
as in China (1.435 m) and will be single-track. In Thailand, after many delays, 
work on the Bangkok-Nakhon Ratchasima high-speed line began in December 
2017, with a contract awarded to the China Railway Construction Corporation, 
as part of an agreement concluded in November 2014,15 then confirmed and 
extended in December 2015 for the construction of a double line of 845 km,16 
work on which was to begin early in 2019.17 Chinese norms have also prevailed 
Map. Belt and Road Initiative rail links: Network (2018) and rail track construction projects. Department of Geography, Laval University, 2018.
Sources: Huang et al . 2018; ESCAP; South China Morning Post; China Railway Corp.; UIC; Russian Railways; Kazakhstan Railways; Rail Professional; Rail Turkey.
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18. “High-speed rail between Yunnan and Myanmar on agenda,” People’s Daily, 22 November 2010, 
http://in.people.cn/90001/90778/90862/7205918.html (accessed on 19 May 2018).
19. “Stalled $20bn Myanmar railway project a setback for Asia-Mideast trade,” Gulf Times, 28 July 
2014, www.gulf-times.com/story/402209/Stalled-20bn-Myanmar-railway-project-a-setback-for 
(accessed on 19 May 2018).
20. Pakistan Government site, “China-Pakistan Economic Corridor,” 2017, http://cpec.gov.pk/
progress-update (accessed on 5 September 2019).
21. “The Rise and Fall of America’s New Silk Road Strategy,” EconoMonitor, 12 May 2017, www.
economonitor.com/blog/2017/05/the-rise-and-fall-of-americas-new-silk-road-strategy/ 
(accessed on 2 September 2019).
22. See the S i lk Road Fund webs ite: “About Us,” 2015, www.s i lk roadfund.com.cn/
enweb/23775/23767/index.html (accessed on 7 November 2017).
here, and the tracks will have standard gauge. After 2021, further work should 
create a link to the Kunming-Vientiane-Nong Khai line (Mottet 2018).
Certain projects have faced setbacks. According to Chinese state media, 
work on a high-speed line between Kunming and Yangon, for instance, was 
expected to begin in 2011,18 but the Myanmar government cancelled the 
project in July 2014.19 Similarly, a project for a new rail track between Kunming 
and Dacca as part of the BCIM (Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar) corridor, 
officially still ongoing, has not progressed as a result of strong reservations on 
the part of India. The projected Kashgar-Karachi-Gwadar rail link in Pakistan, 
notably through Kashmir, a region disputed by India and Pakistan and which 
is part of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), does not seem to 
form part of any short or medium-term projects. At present, Sino-Pakistan 
cooperation is focusing on the modernisation of the Pakistan rail network.20
From a commercial point of view, trans-Asian rail transport development 
projects are nothing new. What is new is the setting up of regular services 
offering door-to-door links from China to Europe. In 2008, on the initiative 
of Deutsche Bahn, a trial was carried out on the Beijing-Hamburg link. The 
service was abandoned, however, following the financial crisis of the same 
year. A further attempt was made in April 2011 on the Chongqing-Duisburg 
link, that is, a distance of 10,300 km in 16 days, on the initiative of a Trans-
Eurasia Logistics partnership between Deutsche Bahn, Kazakhstan Temir Joly 
(KTZ), the China Railway Corporation, and Russian Railways (RZD).
China often revives existing projects
Although these projects are now described as being part of the far-
reaching Chinese policy for the New Silk Road (One Belt, One Road, 一帶一
路 Yidai Yilu) launched in 2013 and renamed the Belt and Road Initiative in 
2015 (NDRC 2015), in fact, this Chinese programme has revived many older 
projects. 
The idea of developing rail (and/or road) infrastructure connecting Europe 
and Asia can be traced back to 1959, when the United Nations Economic 
and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP) and its opposite 
number for Europe, the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 
(UNECE), suggested creating a “Trans-Asian rail network” (Fedorenko 2013; 
Perelman 2015), or Trans-Asian Railway (TAR). Several components of the 
TAR project still exist, such as the North-South Corridor between India and 
Saint Petersburg via Iran and the Caucasus, which Iran, Russia, and Azerbaijan 
agreed to build in 2016 (Dayal 2017; Alterman and Hillman 2017). 
In 1993, the European Union (EU) put forward a plan for a Europe-
Caucasus-Asia Transport Corridor (TCECA) for the development of transport 
between the European Union, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. China was not 
included in this framework agreement. In 1996, the EU started investigating 
the possibility of a common European rail policy, the Trans-European Rail 
Network (TERN). The aim of the project was to facilitate the interoperability 
of various networks. TERN played the role of catalyser in transport unification 
procedures in Europe, then later in the development of common standards 
that would allow Eurasian lines to run. 
In 1997, Russian Railways (RZD) decided to promote their rail service 
offerings. In the early 2000s, RZD originated the idea of an “Asia-Europe 
rail silk road” (Wanderpepen 2017). Once again, this was not a new idea. As 
early as 1967, the Swiss transporter Mat-Transport was trying to organise 
a rail service between Japan and Western Europe via the Trans-Siberian in 
collaboration with a Soviet partner (Helle 1977). 
CAREC 2020 (Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation Programme) 
was set up in 2011 with the support of international financial backers (the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Asian Development 
Bank, the Islamic Development Bank, the IMF, the World Bank, and the 
UNDP). The prime objective of the Programme is to favour the development 
of development corridors. 
In 2011, the United States launched their US New Silk Road Strategy, the 
implicit aim of which was to structure the regions around Afghanistan at a 
time when Washington was planning its exit from the war.21 
In September 2013, in a speech given in Kazakhstan, Chinese President Xi 
Jinping launched the One Belt, One Road (OBOR) project made up of two 
components; the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB), and the Maritime Silk Road 
(MSR). The OBOR project has been renamed the Belt and Road Initiative in 
order to underline the multiplicity of possible routes. Unlike many former 
initiatives, China is supporting this project with major funding: the Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), with a capital of 100 billion US$, was 
created in October 2014 (Weiss 2017), and in November, the Silk Road Fund 
was unveiled, with a capital of 40 billion US$.22
Contrary to a deep-rooted idea, therefore, China was not the originator of 
trans-Asian rail transport projects, either on a conceptual level or in matters 
of commercial initiative, since it was the Deutsch Bahn that initiated the first 
China-Germany train. The realisation of the project is, however, the work of 
China. 
A major development lever in the eyes of the 
Chinese government
In the eyes of Chinese provincial and central governments and businesses 
alike these rail services bring countless advantages, even though, for 
the government, they are not limited to economic advantages, but also 
comport political dimensions that accompany the development of closer 
economic relationships. These rail links open up the possibility of establishing 
production sites for the re-exportation of goods in the interior regions of 
the country, which would be beneficial since the cost of labour and land and 
rates of taxation are much lower than in the coastal provinces (Pantucci and 
Lain 2017; Mayer 2018). However, this strategic option only makes sense 
if transport costs remain low. From this point of view, the construction of 
an efficient infrastructure allows production sites in the interior of China to 
be developed, sites which have long been at a considerable disadvantage 
as a result of the huge transport bottlenecks encountered on routes to the 
Chinese Pacific coast. It also creates the possibility of developing production 
sites in Central Asia, Pakistan, and Southeast Asia (Pantucci and Lain 2017). 
With this in mind, the objective of reducing, by means of delocalising 
production capacity, the excess capacity resulting from the slower growth 
China has been experiencing since 2011 also makes sense if efficient 
transport infrastructures are set up (Cai 2017; Pantucci and Lain 2017), since 
this infrastructure gives products from re-localised production centres access 
to the markets. 
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The boom in these new rail links, coupled with the creation of duty-free 
zones in the interior, has also allowed the central government to breathe 
new life into the China Western Development plan (1999) and the Central 
Development Strategy of 2004 (Zhongyang fazhan zhanlüe 中央發展戰略), 
which were struggling to redress the considerable imbalance in economic 
development between China’s coastal and interior provinces (Lai 2002; 
Mayer 2018). In this respect, the BRI constitutes a tool for renewal and for 
balancing development between the Chinese regions (Cai 2017; Pantucci 
and Lain 2017). Economic rebalancing is an important political issue, 
because for the Communist Party, the legitimacy of its power now lies solely 
in its capacity to ensure growth and to distribute it to the population as a 
whole, since the continuation of significant regional inequalities represents a 
political risk. In particular, ensuring the development of Xinjiang, which has 
been prey to severe instability for several years now, is a major objective for 
the Chinese government since it associates, in part, terrorism with poverty 
and economic stagnation (Lu 2016; Cai 2017; Pantucci and Lain 2017; 
Lincot 2018). Each of these major rail link projects represents a potential 
opportunity for the Chinese rail industry, which is certainly expanding on 
the domestic as well as on the export market (Clerc-Renaud 2016). Beijing 
would like to facilitate the transition of its economy towards industries with 
strong added value, so the construction of high-speed lines and equipment 
abroad represents a major export objective, hence rivalry with Japan in this 
market, giving rise to real diplomatic efforts intended to support the Chinese 
offers (Cai 2017; Rolland 2017).23
These rail services provide a means of opening up regions and countries 
that are currently poorly served, in particular from China’s interior, notably 
Laos, Iran, and Central Asia, and to open up these markets (Rastogi and Arvi 
2014; Pepe 2016), an objective that the leaders of the states concerned 
share, since they see them as a means of reducing their isolation and thereby 
increasing their economic attractiveness (Carcanague 2017).
Lastly, the challenge does not lie in these services’ turnover, since the 
5,000 trains a year the Chinese government is aiming for do not even 
represent 1% of the volume transported in the country. In 2014, Chinese 
rail companies transported 2,300 billion tonnes-kilometres (t-km), and 
RZD transported 1,200 billion t-km, so turnover is not an issue in this 
respect. However, the rapid expansion of a competitive transport service 
and efficient rail companies and logistics capable of measuring up to 
international companies may represent a major economic objective (Li et 
al . 2015; Wanderpepen 2017).
From the announcement effect to regular traffic: 
The economic advantages of the rail Silk Road
The expansion of a diversified offer 
On account of the distances between the centre of China and Western 
Europe (more than 11,000 km), existing services on the market currently 
offer unit-trains that take between 14 and 18 days to cover the distances, 
that is, around 15 days less than the time taken by maritime transport 
between China and Europe. This advantage in terms of transport times 
is useful in optimising just-in-time production and reducing the costs of 
stocking items such as textiles, electronic goods, and automobile parts. 
However, the nature of the products exported (Table 2) has diversified, and 
these now include foodstuffs, lumber, and machinery. The profitability of 
trains mainly depends on the simplification of operations, which explains 
the offer of unit-trains that limit transhipments. Such trains have succeeded 
in achieving a high fill rate in the direction China-Europe, a sign that a real 
demand exists. Between China and Germany alone, for example, traffic has 
risen from 35,000 containers in 2015 to 40,000 in 2017, and 100,000 are 
planned for 2020. The Chinese government anticipates 5,000 trains in 2020 
(State Council of the People’s Republic of China 2016), an objective already 
achieved in 2018 with 6,363 trains. 
Operators now offer several rail links (Table 2). Their services run towards 
Russia and Europe, in times varying from 10 to 22 days, depending on 
the itinerary. The bulk of the offerings come from regions in central China. 
The goods transported are mainly electronic goods, machinery, and small 
electrical household goods, all products with relatively high added value. 
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Table 2. Typology of the links offered on the market of freight rail links between China and other countries.
 Region of China Number of links offered Point of passage to the  Length of journey (days)  Products
  Chinese border
 Southwest 5 Alashankou 13 to 16 Computers, electronic goods,   
     textiles, coffee
   Alashankou  Electronic goods, machinery, 
 Centre 20 Erenhot 12 to 22 information technology,
   Manzhouli  small electrical household goods,   
     automobile parts
 Northwest 8 Alashankou 12 to 15 Machinery, automobile parts,   
     carpets, agricultural products 
 Southeast 6 Alashankou 12 to 19 Electronic goods, machinery,
   Manzhouli  small electrical household goods
 Northeast 6 Manzhouli 10 to 15 Electronic goods, automobile parts,   
     machinery
As of 1 September 2017, most of the services listed here are links between China and Western Europe. Source: Huang and Lasserre (2017).
23. “High-speed rail link expands beyond borders,” China Daily, 19 December 2014, www.chinadaily.
com.cn/world/2014livisitkst/2014-12/19/content_19123994.htm (accessed on 21 May 2018); 
“李克强的‘高鐵外交’成績單” (Li Keqiang de ‘gaotie waijiao’ chengji dan, Report on “the 
diplomacy of high-speed rail links” by Li Keqiang), Xinhua, 26 November 2015, http://news.
xinhuanet.com/finance/2015-11/26/c_128469565.htm (accessed on 22 May 2018).
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What are the economic advantages of these rail routes?
The trans-Asian rail services under development have a reserve of 
productivity at their disposal. Indeed, theoretically, the fastest time for a 
journey of 13,000 km is nine days, travelling at an average speed of 60 
km/h. The possibility of improving the offer and offering faster services 
therefore exists, the question being at what cost and the amount of 
investment needed. Conversely, since vessels with the capacity to carry 
more than 20,000 containers were introduced, the productivity reserves of 
maritime transport have shrunk because the size of these ships cannot be 
increased indefinitely without endangering the safety of the structure of the 
vessels themselves (Tourret 2007).
Although the price of rail transport is far lower than air transport (four 
times less expensive), it nonetheless remains higher than sending goods by 
sea (+100% to + 30%, even + 6% depending on the origin/destination and 
according to the estimates), and the literature frequently mentions prices 
that are four to five times higher.24 For all that, estimates and more recent 
real offers show that the differences are decreasing (Table 3). Major subsidies 
from Chinese provincial governments mean that prices can be lowered (Huang 
and Lasserre 2017), but these subsidies are of varying duration and create 
intense competition between provinces besides raising the question of their 
permanence: how long will provincial governments continue to subsidise 
rail links? The Chinese government has recently indicated that it wants to 
limit the subsidies granted by provincial governments.25 It is certain than the 
deeper the town of origin is situated in the interior of China, the more the 
cost of the maritime link is offset by the cost of the overland journey required 
to reach a port, thereby increasing the total cost of the maritime option. 
However, the price of transporting goods is not the only issue. The length 
of the journey and its regularity are also important factors, especially for 
companies producing products with high added value and working within a 
just-in-time logistics system. This type of production system tries to reduce 
stock and impose lean management of both components and finished 
products. Rail represents a competitive offer in the face of a maritime 
transport market that is sometimes saturated and suffers from delays. 
Moreover, longer transport times represent, in a quantifiable manner, more 
stock than if the transit time between China and Europe is reduced by several 
days, as shown in Table 3. Rail transport is thus more expensive by container, 
but for very large cargos it can represent economies linked to the reduction of 
stock in terms of the movement of components and finished products.
Table 3. Price differentials, China-Europe link. Cost per standard container  
 Source Size of the Itinerary Rail Journey Sea Journey 
  Container   time  time
 
Rodemann and 




  20’ Central route  3,250 euros  2,300 euros
   (Lan-Xin)
 Verny and  20’ Trans-Siberian 1,400-1,800 US$  1,800-2,200 US$
 Grigentin 2009
 Mooney 2016 20’ Central route Approx. 3,500 US$ 23-25 days 720 US$  50 days
      Shanghai-Rotterdam  
 
Pepe 2016
  Lanzhou-Duisbourg,  Freight car only:   1,000-4,000 US$, 
  20’ Central route 6,730 US$ 15-16 days On Shanghai-Rotterdam ?
    Unit-train: 3,300 US$   maritime section for 40.
 JOC.com 2017 40’ Central route Approx. 4,000 US$ 12-25 days Approx. 3,000 US$ 33-35 days
 Wanderpepen 2017   40’ Wuhan – Lyon,  7,000 euros 16 days 4,500 euros 50 days
 and China Daily 2016  Central route
 JOC.com 2017b 40’ Korea – Poland Approx. 7,000 US$ 18-23 days Approx. 4,000 US$ 35-40 days
 DSV 2018 40’ Chongqing-Munich 7,387 US$  3,950 US$
    via Duisbourg  Via Hamburg
 
iContainers 2018
  Chongqing-Munich,    4,319 US$ 
  40’ Central route  4,596 US$ 18 days Via Bremen 31 days
   (Alashankou)
   Chongqing-Munich,  
 DB Schenker 2018 40’ Northern route  6,440 US$ 24 days
   (Erenhot)
 TBN Group 2018 40’ Chongqing-Munich 6,184 US$ 18-20 days
 Maersk 2018 40’ Chongqing-Munich   3,245 US$ 46 days
Sources: Rodemann and Templar (2014); Tom Mooney, “New Asia-Europe rail services added amid weak ocean rates,” JOC.com, 31 May 2016, https://www.joc.com/rail-intermodal/international-rail/asia/china-
europe-rail-routes-continue-add-services_20160531.html (accessed on 18 September 2017); “HMM, SJ Logistics launch Asia-Europe rail service,” JOC.com, 12 December 2017, www.joc.com/rail-intermodal/
international-rail/asia/hmm-sj-logistics-launch-asia-europe-rail-service_20171212.html (accessed on 2 February 2018); “First freight train links China’s Wuhan, France,” China Daily , 6 April 2016, www.
chinadaily.com.cn/business/2016-04/07/content_24341830.htm (accessed on 8 September 2019). Data from shippers and transporters: 2018, collected directly by F. Lasserre.
24. Tom Mooney, “New Asia-Europe rail services added amid weak ocean rates,” JOC.com, 31 May 
2016, https://www.joc.com/rail-intermodal/international-rail/asia/china-europe-rail-routes-
continue-add-services_20160531.html (accessed on 18 September 2017). 
25. “China to scale down subsidies for Europe-bound cargo trains,” GBTimes, 19 October 2018, 
https://gbtimes.com/china-to-scale-down-subsidies-for-europe-bound-cargo-trains (accessed on 
26 April 2019).
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26. “Containers from China to Europe will be inspected without train stopping,” RailFreight, 17 
January 2019, www.railfreight.com/beltandroad/2019/01/17/rail-freight-between-china-and-
russia-to-be-inspected-without-train-stop/?gdpr=accept (accessed on 26 April 2019).
27. Business Monitor International. 2012. China – Infrastructure Report. London: BMI.
28. “China Turns to $503 Billion Rail Expansion to Boost Growth,” Bloomberg, 26 December 2016, 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-12-29/china-to-have-30-000-kilometer-high-
speed-rail-network-by-2020 (accessed on 7 November 2017).
The profitability of these convoys therefore depends on the target market, 
which is currently mainly manufactured products with high added value 
for which shorter delivery times justify the higher price of transport by 
sea (Huang and Lasserre 2017; Huang et al . 2018). Profitability could be 
improved, however, by diversifying the markets, increasing the fill rate on 
Europe-China routes, improving the efficiency of the services offered thereby 
reducing costs, and by enhancing the offer. There are several aspects of the 
transport logistics that could be addressed in order to improve the service 
offer. These involve measures with varying costs and include improving 
infrastructure (doubling the tracks, electrification, refurbishment to increase 
the average speed); improving signalling, which would allow for higher speeds 
and frequency of convoys, even using engines on several different networks; 
improving transhipment operations in the stations where the gauge of the 
tracks changes, and facilitating customs procedures (Rastogi and Arvis 2014; 
Rodemann and Templar 2014; ADB 2017a; Pomfret 2018; Jakóbowski et al . 
2018). Regarding the latter, RZD recently announced the implementation 
of a customs declaration system exempting convoys from any form of 
inspection in the transhipment station of Manzhouli/Zabaykalsk.26
What factors have enabled the arrival of such services?
Just a few years ago, it would have been difficult to imagine the rapid 
development of commercial lines between China and Europe. Their rapid 
expansion is the result of the conjunction of several factors. 
Firstly, some of the advantages are linked to the situation in China. For 
example, there is the presence of infrastructure that has allowed China to 
modernise and develop its network quite considerably, allowing it to transport 
goods more efficiently to the interior of the country, facilitating their export 
and import. Long considered to be a major curb to economic development, 
the transport sector, and especially rail, has benefitted from considerable 
investment over the last 30 years. From 1992 to 2011, China spent 8.5% of 
its gross domestic product (GDP) on infrastructure compared to Japan’s 5%, 
4.7% by India, and less than 3% by the United States (Mayer 2018; see Table 
4). Whilst annual investment in transport infrastructure represented almost 
nothing in 1978, it had increased to around 200 billion RMB (31.35 billion 
US$) by 1998, then increased very rapidly with the development strategies 
of the west (1999) and centre (2004), reaching 1,570 billion in 2008 (246,1 
billion US$) (Pepe 2016). More recently, particular emphasis has been 
placed on the development of rail infrastructure, since from 2004, the State 
Council has approved major investment plans with the aim of expanding 
the network from 79,000 km in 2008 to 90,000 km in 2010 and then to 
120,000 km in 2020, of which 7,000 km are high-speed tracks. The 2009 
Renewal Plan and then the 12th Five-year Plan (2011-2015) have confirmed 
the heavy emphasis placed on investment in rail infrastructure. Achieved as 
early as 2014 (121,000 km), these objectives were set at 180,000 km for 
2020 with 25,000 km of high-speed lines (Pepe 2016).27 
Table 4. Comparative investment by China in rail infrastructure (in 
millions euros in current terms)
  2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2016 2017
 China 23,935 70,183 65,834 81,347 111,893 106,800 105,084
 United 
6,681 7,141 8,336 9,856 15,688  11,480
 States
 Russia 5,434 6,577 9,872 9,787 5,022 4,830 3,609
 India 3,927 4,724 4,944 5,929 11,462  10,368
Source: OECD Statistics, http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?r=794915 (accessed on 16 March 2020).
Another favourable element lies in the desire of numerous companies 
to limit the steep increase in costs incurred by production units situated in 
the coastal provinces. The attractiveness of zones situated in the interior 
of the country has grown alongside increases in production costs (labour, 
land) in the coastal provinces and investment in the rail infrastructure in 
China’s interior, making possible the setting up of reliable rail services. Many 
provincial Chinese governments support these initiatives in order to attract 
foreign and Chinese investment to the region.
The presence of available capital is a considerable asset. China has 
grown richer and now has abundant capital at its disposal to invest in the 
construction of new rail infrastructure thanks to the Silk Road Fund (40 billion 
US$) and the Asian Investment Bank for the infrastructure (capital of 100 
billion US$) and the large amounts of capital invested in the modernisation of 
its domestic network: 503 billion US$ spent in 2016 (Hu 2016).28 
Determined political will is also evident. First and foremost, there exists a 
real desire to stimulate the construction of infrastructure both within China 
and towards other countries, partly to compensate for the economic slowdown 
observable since 2013, but also because the construction of a modern 
transport network represents an advantage in the development of markets in 
Asia and as far afield as Europe. There is real economic ambition behind the 
modernisation of a rail network that has long been considered inefficient and 
that represents a curb to the development of China’s interior regions. Then, we 
note the wish to cooperate in the simplification of customs procedures, with, 
for example, the Smart and Secure Trade Lanes Pilot Agreement with Russia, the 
European Union, and the countries of Central Asia. This has been in negotiation 
since 2006, and stage by stage it is enabling the setting up of simplified 
customs procedures (NDRC 2015; Pepe 2016; European Commission 2016).
Lastly, China is playing on the current prestige of the BRI label. By enshrining 
these projects in the politico-economic Belt and Road Initiative programme, 
the Chinese government is actively supporting them because they contribute 
to the reinforcement of strong economic and financial links with neighbouring 
countries. Very many of these long-standing Chinese projects have therefore 
been ascribed to the BRI label in order to increase its visibility.
Advantages specific to Europe have also favoured the rapid expansion of these 
services. We note, for example, the creation of large transport groups capable of 
coordinating complex logistics and negotiating with the Russians, Chinese, and 
Kazakhs. These include the German Deutsche Bahn companies, France’s SNCF 
International, and their numerous subsidiaries, notably DB Schenker, Geodis, 
and Keolis. We have also noted reform in the governance of transport in the 
European Union with the arrival of a unified freight market (operating in open 
access) that facilitates the proliferation of multimodal uniplatforms to the 
hinterlands beyond state frontiers, dismantling the partitioning of the markets. 
Lastly, European companies are benefitting from recognised know-how in the 
management of rolling stock and multinational rail logistics.
Commercial and financial uncertainties
Are these lines profitable in the face of logistical difficulties?
The continuing expansion of rail business between China and Europe, the 
Middle East, and Southeast Asia corresponds to the ambitions of the Chinese 
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government and is a component of economic partnerships that would seem to 
be extremely attractive for countries bordering China. But can this development 
continue at the same pace in the medium and long term? Several commercial, 
logistical, and technical constraints will have to be managed. 
First and foremost, long-distance rail links often run into problems of 
load breaking as a result of differing gauge metrics. Although China, Iran, and 
Europe operate with the almost standard gauge of 1.435 m, this is not the 
case in Southeast Asia, Russia, and Central Asia (1.52 m), nor in Pakistan and 
India (1.676 m). Each break-of-gauge point involves either the transhipment 
of containers or the adjustment of the wheel gauge. Solutions exist but they 
are time-consuming, take several hours for each container convoy, and much 
longer for non-containerised goods, since they must first either be transferred 
or the wheel gauge or bogies changed, and require infrastructure sufficiently 
large and equipped to carry out the maintenance of trucks or containers. In 
this respect, it is not certain that Khorgos or Alashankou stations, for example, 
could cope effectively with a rapid increase in traffic. Over and above the 
political and commercial issues attendant on the exportation of rail norms, 
it is clear that the construction of new rail tracks built to Chinese norms 
represents a logistical element that favours the fluidity of rail services.
The circulation of trains on national networks also comes up against 
differences in signalling and traffic control. Crews must be changed, and 
sometimes engines as well, so that drivers and machines alike can interpret 
the signals and the instructions of the traffic controllers correctly. Here, 
too, trains can run, but increasing the fluidity of the service means that 
operational solutions to these technical interruptions must be found. 
Certain rail segments also risk rapidly arriving at the limit of their capacity. 
In particular, the single-track segments of the Yining-Khorgos and Urumqi-
Alashankou lines have the potential to become bottlenecks.
The service, therefore, comes up against bottlenecks resulting from the 
differing capacity of the various transit points, as previously mentioned. The 
rapid increase in traffic, especially in the Asia-Europe direction, from 2017 has 
already led to delays at transit points on the European network, in particular 
at the Malaszewicze-Brest and European terminals. Operators are trying to 
adapt by opening new transhipment stations: Siemianówka (Poland)-Svislach 
(Belorussia) in March 2017, Kuznica (Poland)-Bruzhi (Belorussia) in August 
2017, and Kaliningrad in October 2017.29 It is certain that the increase in 
traffic will require additional investment in order to double the tracks and 
increase the capacity for processing the convoys.30 The question of the possible 
saturation of the Trans-Siberian therefore arises, since international container 
transport traffic on the line rose from 70,000 in 1999 to 640,000 in 2012 and 
may well rise further to reach 1 million in a few years hence (Pepe 2016).31
Given that the modernisation of the Chinese domestic network should 
improve the reliability and the cost of links between China’s interior regions 
and its ports, the differential in the prices offered and competitiveness in the 
face of maritime transport are two major elements that will determine the 
development of the trans-Asian share of the rail freight market. It is through 
both the scale economies achieved through an increase in traffic and 
improvements in reliability and transport times that the cost of rail services 
will become attractive for clients in the long term. 
The very low fill rate for return journeys to China is contributing to driving 
up prices. At present, clients are mainly export companies located in China. 
Very few European companies are taking advantage of these services to sell 
their products in China, resulting in trains that are often empty on the return 
journey. Logistics companies are very much aware of this and are striving 
to identify transport markets. We are beginning to see dispatches in the 
Europe-China direction. These include automobile parts for BMW factories in 
China, Scotch whisky, French wine, Polish pork, and medicines. 
The problem of finance
The question of finance also arises, since the needs of infrastructure are 
colossal. In 2017, the Asian Development Bank estimated that investment in 
infrastructure in Asia between 2016 and 2030 amounted to 22,500 billion 
US$ in a baseline scenario, of which 7,796 billion US$ went to transport 
infrastructure (BAD 2017b). As a result, although Beijing is actively promoting 
many construction projects, China does not intend to finance them all 
itself. Quite the contrary: partner countries are expected to assume their 
share of the investment. Beijing offers financial solutions, but the conditions 
offered are not always to the liking of the partners, especially since they 
are sometimes already deeply in debt and have a rather low rating on their 
sovereign debt. As a result, many Chinese financial institutions, already very 
exposed as a result of numerous unreliable loans and consequently erring on 
the side of caution, hesitate to take further risks (Cai 2017). 
The contract between China and Laos, for example, hit a long-lasting 
stumbling-block with the interest rate offered for work on the Boten-
Vientiane high-speed line (Mottet 2016). Similarly, the final green light for 
work on the Bangkok-Nakhon Ratchasima high-speed line was delayed by a 
disagreement over the financial conditions offered by the Chinese (Crispin 
2016). For the Moscow-Kazan project, RZD seemed unsatisfied with the 
financial conditions offered by the China Development Bank, which offered 
7 billion US$ over 20 years at an interest rate of 4% and a 1.9 billion US$ 
capital investment. The Russian side wanted a higher loan, lower Chinese 
participation in the assets, a lower interest rate, and a longer repayment 
period… A preliminary agreement was signed in October 2018, but 
several members of the Russian government have made no secret of their 
scepticism in the face of a project the estimated costs of which have risen 
from 14.4 billion US$ to 24.5 billion US$ (Gabuev 2017; Petrovsky 2018).
Conclusion
The rail link development projects for trans-Asian freight links date back 
further than the New Silk Road project, but they were certainly revived in 
a spectacular fashion with its launch. Although few specialists considered 
the development of freight rail services between China and Europe to be 
plausible, we are now seeing a rapid expansion (admittedly still modest) 
in the volume and number of services offered, all accompanied by the 
construction of new rail infrastructure in Russia and China connecting them 
to Southeast Asia, Iran, and Pakistan. Over and above the lever that these 
services and infrastructure represent for the opening up of China’s western 
and central regions, the development of these rail links favours the creation 
of new markets and the development of trade, strengthening the economic 
relationships that China hopes to forge not only with its nearest foreign 
neighbours, but also with European partners. 
These projects also offer China a powerful lever for exporting its rail 
standards and consequently exercising a non-negligible influence over its 
neighbours’ transport sectors, which takes the form of Beijing’s search for 
increased economic and political influence through the strengthening not 
only of its commercial weight, but also of its normative role (Seaman 2018). 
29. “Eurasian rail traffic in 2018: Heading to a million TEUs,” RailFreight, 24 December 2018, www.
railfreight.com/specials/2018/12/24/eurasian-rail-traffic-in-2018-heading-to-a-million-teus/ 
(accessed on 26 April 2019). 
30. “Rising Asian volumes choke Europe rail terminals,” JOC.com, 9 August 2017, https://www.
joc.com/rail-intermodal/international-rail/asia/rising-asian-volumes-choke-europe-rail-
terminals_20170809.html (accessed on 2 February 2018).
31. “Russia invests EUR 227 Million by 2015 in developing container transport on the Trans-Siberian,” 
Railway Pro, 23 April 2014, https://www.railwaypro.com/wp/russia-invests-eur-227-million-by-
2015-in-developing-container-transport-on-the-trans-siberian/ (accessed on 25 May 2018).
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In this respect, the promotion of rail corridors by the Chinese government 
as part of the BRI program carries with it an important strategic dimension. 
The BRI includes numerous geopolitical projects for which rail tracks are a 
potential tool, confirming once again the major geopolitical element of the 
construction of transport infrastructure (Lasserre et al . 2016; Carcanague 
and Hache 2017; Wanderpepen 2017). Although in the short term the BRI 
aims to favour the growth of trade, this commercial objective also covers 
two strategic dimensions. On the one hand, it aims to place the Chinese rail 
network at the heart of neighbouring countries’ export routes by multiplying 
links, built to Chinese norms, and on the other, it serves to strengthen the 
privileged economic relationships that Beijing intends to develop with its 
neighbours both through trade and loans and investment in infrastructure, in 
order to increase their economic integration into China.
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